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INTRODUCTION 
PERIODICALLY, CONCERNS ABOUT T H E L A W and its operations, and its 
relevancy to contemporary society, induce a variety of commentators (including 
politicians and legal practitioners) to reflect on the desirability of reform. In England, 
from the nineteenth century on, such reflections have frequently focused on the 
desirability of establishing the codification of the criminal law. Over the last fifteen 
years, with codification once more starting to appear on the reformist agenda, there has 
been an interest in examining the previous serious attempts at codification, those of the 
sixty-odd years between 1830 and the late 1880s, in order to extract lessons from them.1 
The assigning of 'blame' for the failure of these attempts provides a sub-text indicating 
a current regret for 'lost opportunity'.2 Heroes, notably Sir James Fitzjames Stephen 
and Lord Brougham, and villains, including Sir Alexander Cockburn and other (often 
unspecified) leading members of the judiciary, have loomed large in the essentially 
narrative examinations of nineteenth century codification. The responsibility for the 
historic failure of this essentially Utopian project is assigned primarily to the 
machinations of the villains, principally Cockburn. Some recent comment has also 
sought to explain the disappearance of the proposed Code Victoria from the 
politico-legal landscape of the 1880s by pointing to a supposed lack of contemporary 
support for the project, especially within Parliament.3 Yet neither interpretation can be 
fully sustained as explaining the demise of codification attempts, especially when the 
codification project is placed in the wider societal context. 
There was considerable support, both inside and outside Parliament for this grand 
project. This included the judiciary, who have been unfairly landed with the largest 
share of the responsibility for the failure of the codification project, especially during 
the 1870s and 1880s. Indeed, had the project been persisted with, it is highly likely that 
it would have passed into law. It is also misleading to focus too much on Stephen, and 
the condemnation of his code by Cockburn. For one thing, Cockburn died in 
November 1880, and more importantly, there were alternative versions of a draft 
criminal code available during that decade. Thus, the 'disappearance' of the codifi-
cation project later in the 1880s cannot be solely ascribed to either the 'failure' of 
Stephen or the machinations of Cockburn or other members of a hostile judiciary. 
Instead, this article explores the interfaces between law, society and politics to explain 
the disappearance of codification from the legal reform agenda. 
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It is frequently presumed that legal discourse needs to be assessed, in scholarly terms, 
independently of the chronological dimensions provided by consideration of the 
historical societal contexts.4 However, the original motivations for the codification 
project, and the factors leading to genuinely determined efforts to place codification on 
the statute books, only become substantial when examined against a broad range of 
socio-cultural and economic factors. Aspirant legal reformers, and interested poli-
ticians, as well as the opponents of codification, were very powerfully influenced by 
contemporary considerations. Too narrow a focus, especially on James Stephen's 
efforts and reactions to his initiatives, encourages neglect of the full range of 
considerations driving nineteenth century personalities interested in codification. This 
provides lessons for assessments of current interest in codification. Efforts at legal 
remedies for social ills can be said to come to prominence at times when widespread 
contemporary fears, whether based in reality or not, seem to argue for the imminence 
of social dystopias. This article will thus place the issue of legal reform at the heart of 
the search for the ideal society in Britain, providing a framework for a consideration 
of current projects in the light of desires for the ideal or Utopian European community. 
VISIONS OF A CODE VICTORIA 
Concerns about the impact of increases in population size and urbanisation in the early 
nineteenth century created a cultural climate in which fears of a potentially dystopian 
future for Britain could flourish. The perceived threat to the social order of public 
disorder, criminal behaviour and immorality arguably precipitated a shift towards a 
more formal regulation of society through the universal application of national codified 
laws as the most practical remedy against chaos.5 Legal visionaries, such as Lord 
Brougham, believed that the fundamental framework of the law and its potential 
prescription for defining national standards of societal behaviour could deliver the 
concept of an idealised future or social Utopia. They believed that the invocation, at 
increased levels, of legislation to prevent, curb and punish anti-social activities would 
provide an effective remedy to this perceived threat. Providing the substance for the 
realisation of their vision of an absolute and comprehensive codification of the existing 
body of criminal law required unwavering self-belief and determination beyond the 
human will of many of their contemporaries. The visionary masterplans of such 
thinkers provided the material for one of the most ambitious projects in legal and 
social engineering ever undertaken in England, though it can be argued there was 
precedent for such in Napoleonic France. As already emphasised, such visionary 
undertakings deserve to be interpreted not just as a reformulation of the law, but as 
an exercise in social forecasting in direct reaction to contemporary crises. The idea was 
that the law, properly enacted, has the capacity to provide a social Utopia by 
attempting to create a better and more stable society, safeguarding it against 
lawlessness by means of an easily accessible and wide-ranging legislative code. 
As early as 1623, Sir Francis Bacon had proposed that obsolete laws be repealed to 
avoid stifling the living laws "in the embraces of the dead".6 Hale also advocated a 
Corpus Juris Communis, though failed, formally, to develop his ideas. The nineteenth 
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century English equivalents of visionaries like Bacon and Hale were fascinated by the 
1811 French Code d'Instruction Criminelle and Code Penal which incorporated, and 
defined, universally accepted societal norms, envisioning the future health and security 
of the French nation. In the context of an on-going debate over levels of criminality 
and the effectiveness of the legal system, the need for a re-organisation of the existing 
substantive criminal law was widely agreed: "The rough general rules (which left much 
scope to individual judges and juries) and a maze of statutory detail (which sought to 
delimit the range of the death penalty) was coming to seem seriously inadequate to the 
reform-minded".7 Apart from anything else, there was a practical incentive to reform 
provided by the increasing difficulties experienced by non-summary courts in achieving 
convictions, even in apparently clear-cut cases. Juries were notoriously reluctant to 
convict, especially because of the huge range of offences which carried the death 
penalty. This is the context in which, in 1824, the ambitious enterprise of codifying and 
consolidating the whole of the criminal law was first mooted: it undermined the 
so-called "economy of deterrence" which governed thinking on crime and punishment 
in the interests of social stability.8 
At this period, a mixture of religio-moral (Evangelical) and philosophical (Util i-
tarian) idealisms shaped the thinking of many influential figures in British society, 
creating a climate in which a reform agenda became central to political strategies, 
regardless of governmental party complexion. It is, here, worth pointing out that 
(unlike many current reforms) the major nineteenth century legal reforms were, with 
the possible exception of the franchise campaigns, never central to party politics. 
Support for, or opposition to, such reforms operated largely independently of party 
loyalties. This was important, for it ensured the continuation of debates, in Select 
Committees and Royal Commissions, through changes of government. 
For those interested in legal reform, Bentham's Principles of Penal Law, seeking 
rationale and clarity in the law through the application of scientific principles, was a 
central text. Benthamites (including figures like Lord Brougham) believed law should 
be enacted in the interests of the greater good, where definable harm could be shown 
to result from a particular practice or conduct.9 In 1824, the then Home Secretary, Sir 
Robert Peel, responded to the widespread consciousness of a compelling need for 
action, setting up a Select Committee which reported in 1825. The recommendation 
was for the consolidation and simplification of the criminal law, and on that basis, Peel 
introduced legislation in March 1826. The primary objective was beginning the not 
insignificant task of harmonising and consolidating the immense array of existing legal 
rules and common law doctrines into formal legislation. It was estimated that there 
were 20,000 existing Acts of Parliament contained in some 36 volumes, which 
necessitated identification, cataloguing and condensation. Parliamentary support for 
the reforms mirrored wider support amongst respectable society. Peel and the 
succeeding Whig ministry successfully piloted through the first Criminal L a w Amend-
ment Acts 1826-32, comprising eleven consolidated statutes. For example, in 1828, law 
relating to offences against the person was targeted. The Act repealed some 60 existing 
statutory provisions (dating back to the reign of Henry III), and consolidated 38 new 
sections.10 Many of these formed the basis of the subsequent all-encompassing Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861. Manchester comments that in securing the co-operation 
7
 W. R. Cornish and G . de N . Clark, Law and Society in England 1750-1950 (Sweet and Maxwell, 1989) at p. 598. 
8
 Eastwood, op.cil. 
9
 See, "Bentham's Papers on Codification" (1817) Edinburgh Review; A . Manchester, A Modern Legal History of England 
and Wales 1750-1950 (Butterworths, 1980) at pp. 39-40. 
10
 An Act for consolidating and amending the Statutes in England relative to the Offences against the Person 9 Geo.IV, 
c.31. 
28 Nottingham Law Journal 
of the judges Peel surpassed the efforts of all other subsequent reformers during the 
nineteenth century." However, his success must be assessed against the background of 
lawlessness then current. It must also be added that it was a very limited first step in 
consolidation, and that its real significance, certainly in the broader social context, lay 
elsewhere. 
As historians emphasise, the major contemporary resonance was that Peel was 
successful through his reforms in reducing the list of offences carrying a mandatory 
death penalty.12 In promoting a renewed effectiveness in the legal system, he initially 
was held simply to have reinvigorated the economy of deterrence. However, he 
undoubtedly promoted impulses for further legal reform as a remedy for societal ills. 
In the climate of continuing unrest (including the development of the Chartist 
movement) after passage of the Great Reform Act in 1832, the example of the 
successful management by the French authorities of the 1830 'revolution' encouraged 
the supporters of what constituted a hugely ambitious enterprise - the codification of 
the entire criminal law. In July 1833 Brougham, the Lord Chancellor, appointed a 
Royal Commission to digest the enacted, and unenacted, criminal law into two new 
statutes entitled Crimes and Punishments, and Criminal Procedure. Brougham regarded 
the inquisitorial system used by French justice as more effective in controlling the 
unruly urban masses, having little time for the flexibilities of the English common law 
or for powers of judicial interpretation.13 In this, he was in line with utilitarian 
thought. The Criminal Law Commission, acknowledged as Benthamite in its member-
ship, comprised some formidable names, including the highly respected Professors of 
Law, John Austin, Thomas Starkie, and Andrew Amos as well as the lawyer Henry 
Bellenden Ker; something which underlines the potential for support for the project 
within the legal profession. 
It is, also, a mark of the widespread cross-party political support for this exercise in 
legal reform that, despite changes in government, a Criminal Law Commission 
remained active into the 1850s, though with various modifications to the membership 
and the precise shape of its remit for reform. The members laboured assiduously, 
producing 13 reports in as many years. The Fourth Report, for example, was critical 
of the unsystematic and contradictory accumulation of laws, lacking any firm rationale 
or principle, especially in relation to offences against the person and property. 
Brougham consistently ensured that their comments were brought before Parliament. 
In May 1844, he tabled a Draft Act of Crimes and Punishments, asking "How much 
longer will Parliament be content to let the Criminal Law lie scattered over so many 
books - locked up in so many statutes - floating, as it were, in the air of Westminster 
Hall".14 Ignorance of the law is, of course, no defence - but as Brougham pointed out, 
how could the people possibly know what constituted the law if it was so vague and 
uncertain? 
Brougham also deprecated the creative role of the judiciary in developing and 
augmenting the criminal law through judicial diktat rather than Parliamentary debate: 
"I want . . . to leave as little as possible to the judge's discretion. . . I would have the 
law speak through the judge who delivers it, and not the judge make the law he 
delivers".15 The judicial stranglehold on the control of the law prompted Brougham to 
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comment that this was "a great and incurable defect", only to be mitigated through the 
promulgation of a more prescriptive Code. Adopting the French model of the Code 
Civile would, he advocated, "rescue the judges from the chaos of the Ancient law", 
giving them a "code purged of such shameful impurities".16 In 1849, the Commission-
ers issued their last report on criminal procedure, but apart from a handful of short 
Acts (covering specific subjects such as burglary, robbery, and arson) little, immedi-
ately, seemed to have resulted from these endeavours. It was, according to Cross, the 
"largest and most abortive enterprise yet seen in this country".17 Yet this is an unjust 
criticism. It undoubtedly advanced the project of codification by helping to provide the 
framework for the subsidiary project of consolidation. This in turn was seen as a vital 
preliminary to the passage of the further parliamentary reform which, during the 1850s, 
was identified as a necessary societal development. 
Thomas has argued that tidying up the criminal law and making it more accessible 
was possibly of less importance to the Commissioners, and presumably to would-be 
reformers in Parliament, than the opportunity "to reduce the scope for arbitrary 
decision-making by prosecutors, judge and juries alike".18 However, this is to ignore 
the pressures placed on the legal system and politicians by societal developments. 
Particularly after 1848, and despite increasing individual and national prosperity, there 
were growing fears over the threats to communal and national security posed by the 
'dangerous' classes, those identified as most likely to need the attentions of the courts.19 
If Chartism was seen as a spent force, the masses to whom it had appealed were still 
believed to be a constant menace in the social climate of the 1850s.20 The same 
commentators, such as Brougham, Viscount Ingestre, or John Parker, who promoted 
codification were also vocal on these issues in a wide range of periodicals and 
newspapers throughout the 1850s.21 They recognised that a further extension of the 
franchise was inevitable, and sought to promote prior legislative reform to ensure that 
this expansion of democracy did not destabilise the nation. This is underlined by 
Brougham's comments to the Lords in March 1855. He argued that codification 
"would not only separate the disreputable classes from the bettermost folks, and thus 
restrain the former, but it would render riotous proceedings and other like outrages 
impossible".22 A highly refined and well-elaborated criminal law, with an effective 
means of execution, was crucial if society was to move forward from the legal relics 
and barbarism of the previous unenlightened age to a more enterprising, bright and 
democratic future. 
The filibustering and protracted debate that surrounded codification proposals 
underlines the gap between vision and reality: the Commission had identified its 
desirability, but not put forward any schedule for its establishment that Parliament 
could consider acceptable. In 1852 Lord St. Leonards ensured the enactment of a digest 
of criminal offences. Charles Sprengel Greaves, (editor of Russell on Crimes), and 
James John Lonsdale were directed to reconsider and amend the Bills produced by the 
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Commissioners, incorporating both statute and common law. They were advised to 
start with the one area widely acknowledged to be the most important, and 
problematic, that concerning offences against the person. 
CONSOLIDATING THE POSITION 
Consolidation was not, as examination of the parliamentary debates indicates, without 
its controversies. It was not until 1861 that the resultant act passed onto the statute 
books. But its lengthy and stormy passage emphasises the point that, where there are 
wider societal factors driving on reform, opposition related to legal detail succumbs to 
the wider imperatives. In 1853, Lord Cranworth, succeeding St. Leonards, solicited the 
views of the judiciary and asked for their comments on the draft bills relating to 
offences against the person and larceny, but received a none too favourable response. 
His judicial colleagues were opposed to the idea of codification; fearing (rightly) that 
politicians and visionaries such as Brougham would see consolidation as a first step 
along the path to codification.23 Vociferous criticisms were made to the effect that the 
Bill was totally wrong in principle with considerable inaccuracies, blunders and 
mistakes.24 But despite this, the will to achieve consolidation as a measure of social as 
well as legal reform continued throughout the 1850s, punctuated by reminders from 
Brougham of the ultimate dream of criminal codification. The consolidation brief was 
to simplify "the statute laws of the realm,. .. [or parts thereof] combining with that 
process, if they should think it advisable, the incorporation of any parts of the common 
law or unwritten law", in the interests of a more orderly society.25 
The Statute Law Commission appointed in 1854 initially resolved to consolidate the 
whole of the statutory criminal law and employed an army of barristers to assist them. 
It was a huge task. Over 14,000 statutes needed to be reduced to approximately 300 
new enactments.26 But some of those involved, notably Greaves, were concerned 
about the long-term impact of restricting the reforms to consolidation. Even if all the 
obstacles could be surmounted and "all the statutes consolidated, without alteration or 
amendment, what would be effected by it?"27 As the law would not be changed or 
altered in any substantive manner the end result would simply be a collection of 
statutory provisions including those that ought to be repealed. Greaves made his 
reservations known to Cranworth. The consequence was the preparation of nine 
consolidating Bills which were later reduced to the seven Consolidating Acts of 1861. 
The Commission also threw up a number of problems associated with consolidation: 
problems which undoubtedly in the longer term highlighted the need to consider the 
greater possibilities contained in codification, with its opportunities for amendments to 
existing legislation.28 In the Commons, for example, Mr Bowyer criticised the whole 
consolidation process on the grounds there was much "repetition and unnecessary 
matter" which might have been reduced "had there been proper scientific definitions of 
what constituted certain offences".29 
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Subsequent perspectives have downplayed the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act, 
arguing that it was spectacularly flawed, lacking cohesion and rationale. Yet its 
importance was enormous: it was arguably the most significant piece of positivist 
legislation to be enacted during the nineteenth century. Its effects have been lingering. 
Even today it is responsible for some 80,000 offences a year (though its repeal is now 
impending). Yet despite defects in its draftsmanship, the Act was fundamental in fusing 
both existing statutory provisions and some common law rulings to prescribe a 
national centralised standard of behaviour. It certainly made the dream of codification 
more substantial, even if contemporaries did not immediately comprehend this. 
Greaves, for example, concluded that "I have shown that codification is out of the 
question and that mere consolidation is impracticable" and advised that reform should 
be approached by taking a specific subject, collecting all the clauses on that subject and 
confining all amendments to those that are absolutely and practically necessary.30 
As early as 1863, discussion of codification reappeared, as part of the wider dialogue 
focusing on further (and better) attempts at consolidation. Westbury raised the issue in 
the Lords, and The Times gave it a considerable airing, showing a growing degree of 
public endorsement. Another Royal Commission was appointed in 1866, but its efforts 
became lost in the debates surrounding the Reform Act of 1867. It was hoped that this 
further extension of the franchise would provide an alternative remedy against the 
threats to individual and national happiness provided by the dangerous classes. It did 
not. In the eyes of contemporaries, fears over the level and type of offending 
continued.31 The focus returned to legal reform, but this time with added urgency. The 
increased levels of democracy resulting from the 1867 Reform Act, and the relative 
failure of the 1861 Act to control the excesses of the dangerous classes, made concerns 
over the threats posed by an enfranchised but unenlightened mass electorate more 
acute. During the 1870s even the trades union movement saw its cause, that of the 
skilled worker, as being advanced by better control over a range of societal menaces 
from individuals and groups alienated from respectable society by economic and social, 
as well as political, factors. With consolidation making codification seem more viable, 
discussion of the project reached its peak. 
PROFESSIONAL RIVALRIES A N D POLITICAL A G E N D A S 
The abortive 1866 Commission did achieve one consequence of note in interesting a 
number of legal commentators in the concept of codification of the criminal law. 
Amongst them was the figure most concentrated on by subsequent scholarship (partly 
because of his well-established skills of self-publicity): the eminent jurist and commen-
tator, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen. Already a self-proclaimed Benthamite and an 
admirer of Macauley the framer of the 1835 Indian Penal Code, Stephen readily 
embraced the arguments for codification. He has proved to be its most enduringly 
high-profile advocate, though not necessarily amongst the best qualified of the legal 
reformers of the period. However, one of the reasons why he does form an important 
resource for scholars interested in assessing Victorian efforts at codification is that 
Stephen was a prolific journalist as well as an active lawyer. As part of his support for 
codification, Stephen discussed not just the details of his proposed draft and criticisms 
thereof, but also put his legal proposals firmly in the context of the social imperatives 
requiring such change, though this aspect has been less focused on. Deeply interested 
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in the criminal law and the ethical problems it posed, Stephen had previously compared 
the differences between the adversarial approach of the English legal system and the 
inquisitorial one of the French, in terms of their social impact far more than their 
discrete, legal coherence.32 In his articles and books, Stephen had anticipated his 
coming role in his suggestion that the 1861 Consolidating Acts be re-enacted in a 
simpler and less technical form because of the social need therefor. He had also 
previously proposed the creation of a Ministry of Justice "to direct the administration 
of the law and superintend criminal legislation" for similarly societal reasons.33 Yet in 
the late 1860s, Stephen was unconvinced of either the practicality or the desirability of 
codification of the criminal law in the purely legal dimension. Other figures took the 
lead in working on potential schemes, including Serjeant Woolrych, who produced a 
draft code in 1869. 
However, in that year Stephen began to qualify himself as the leading public 
advocate for codification, thanks to his appointment as the legal member of the 
Governor-General's Council in India. There, codification of the criminal law was 
already well-advanced as a result of the identified need to safeguard against any future 
uprisings or major unrest by promoting 'civilisation' in India. A practical criminal 
code, which was also accessible to Victoria's Indian subjects, was seen as an essential 
in this civilising exercise. Stephen praised Macauley's 1835 efforts at an Indian Penal 
Code thus, "[it] Seems to me to be the most remarkable . . . [it has] triumphantly stood 
the ordeal of 21 years experience . . . and has been more successful than any other 
statute of comparable dimensions".34 In a remarkable effort, Stephen formulated what 
became known as the Indian Criminal Code by expurgating all extraneous sections 
of English criminal law, simplifying the remainder, and amalgamating that with 
Macauley's work.35 Flushed with self-confidence as a result, Stephen became convinced 
that codification of the English criminal law was both desirable and practical as a tool 
in the campaign to civilise the English counterparts of the Indian dangerous classes, 
though he still doubted the willingness of Parliament to enact such a measure. 
Finding, on return from India in 1872, that codification was once more under 
discussion by both legal and social reformers, Stephen took the opportunity to develop 
a central role in the debates. The narrative of his involvement during this period is 
rehearsed at length in a number of recent volumes, and it is not proposed to repeat this 
here.36 However, it is important to comment on the reasons why Stephen, rather than 
any of the other would-be codifiers, achieved contemporary prominence, particularly in 
the political arena. Stephen's journalism undoubtedly ensured that his intervention 
would attract a high public profile, but would not necessarily convince hard-headed 
politicians that he was a good choice to spearhead a serious attempt to enact a criminal 
code. First and foremost, Stephen was the one extant English legal figure who had 
developed a code and seen it put into practice, with contemporary Indian comment 
praising its accessibility.37 Moreover, though it attracted criticism, there was, as Sir 
John Holker stressed, also substantial praise. It was seen as a successful enterprise.38 
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Stephen also emphasised the debt he owed to English criminal law in drawing up his 
Code (produced in a remarkably short period of time), making his claims for successful 
codification seem credible. 
This all amounted to substantial credentials in the eyes of administrators like Holker 
whose support depended on its realisation within a measurable period of time, and on 
its presentation in a form which would make it an asset to government. Stephen 
stressed that his proposals took account of these factors.39 He reviewed the 1861 Acts 
as a preliminary, asserting that while "They have been of great practical convenience 
in the administration of justice. . . Their arrangement is so obscure, their language so 
lengthy and cumbrous . . . [that] they present a strange assemblage of incongruities".40 
Stephen estimated his codification of these Acts could reduce them to less than a 
quarter of their existing length. He was also willing to tackle the problem that had 
defeated the Commission in 1857, that of defining the crime of murder. Sections 11-15 
of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 which provided eight different methods of 
attempting to commit murder could, he insisted, be condensed into the single line 
"Whosoever attempts to commit murder shall . ..". Stephen compared the parts of the 
1861 Acts which required reform "to stakes in the bed of a stream which have become 
the centres of masses of weed and obstructions of every description. If the stakes were 
pulled out the water would run clear".41 
Offering to undertake this labour in 1877, Stephen promised that a draft could be 
completed by the end of the year.42 It was, and in a form which made it clear he 
remained fully conscious of the societal pressures driving governmental interest in the 
project: 
I do not believe that any offence known to the common law is unintentionally omitted 
from the Code. If any such offence exists, it must be one which, after the most careful 
search and inquiry, was unknown to every member of the Criminal Code Commission, and 
. . . if it exists, can scarcely be of any real danger to society.43 
Though not the first attempt at such a draft, it was the first to be taken seriously, 
being referred to the Statute Law Consideration Committee for their confidential 
observations.44 These were not uncritical, but (particularly in the climate of the time) 
were sufficiently encouraging to convince the government to consider them further. 
Much has been made by recent scholarship of the resistance that Stephen's code 
encountered, from the judiciary and above all, from the Lord Chief Justice, Sir 
Alexander Cockburn.45 It is explained as the reason why the project failed to come to 
fruition in 1879-80, and (along with other "pressing" business including Irish troubles) 
why there was no sustained attempt to represent codification to Parliament. This is 
misleading. That there was significant opposition is undoubted, and some of it was 
based on genuine concerns relating to the legal dimensions of the draft code. But much 
opprobrium, such as that emanating from R.S. Wright, related to professional rivalry. 
Wright was another who had drafted a colonial criminal code (for Jamaica), which was 
it had operated in practice. See M L . Friedland, "R.S. Wright's Model Criminal Code: A Forgotten Chapter in the 
History of the Criminal Law" (1981) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies vol. 1, at p. 308; Courtenay Ilbert, Methods of 
Legislation (University of London Press, 1912). 
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actually intended to provide the model for other colonial codes. However, by the time 
he produced his code in 1878, Wright must have suspected that the greater publicity 
accorded to Stephen's Indian Code would incline colonial administrations to look to 
the India Office model and not his own. 
It could not, of course, be denied that Cockburn's hostility was profoundly 
damaging, but only in the short term. Cockburn, who had a far higher opinion of 
himself and his abilities than was shared by most of his contemporaries, had expected 
to be asked to chair the Royal Commission considering the draft code. Vexation at his 
'exclusion' reached such a level that, as Home Office records show, Lord Cairns was 
forced to take a hand in the ensuing bitter clash of personalities to try to soothe 
Cockburn's injured feelings.47 The Commission presented their completed report on 
12 June 1879, the same day that Cockburn sent a long letter to the Attorney General 
outlining his dissatisfaction with the Bill. Cockburn claimed he strongly opposed the 
Bill's passage into law because of its defects. While this may be true to some extent, 
the timing and the record of his earlier resentments suggests very strongly the addition 
of a more personal motivation. Though in terms of daily practical politics, Cockburn's 
opposition was damning, leading Holker to withdraw the code (despite his own 
rejection of Cockburn's criticisms) it was not, at the time, seen as the end of the 
project. Indeed, it reappeared in early 1880, but again failed to pass onto the statute 
books. 
The usual conclusion is that the change of administration in April 1880, and the 
consequent shifting positions of key personnel interested in codification, such as 
Holker, ensured that there would be no further immediate attempt at introducing 
legislation to Parliament.48 This seems a reasonable conclusion. However, it is less 
reasonable to argue that, despite some further efforts by Stephen, the codification 
dream evaporated because of lack of popular support and parliamentary interest.49 
Such emphasis over-inflates Stephen's importance. After all, when the codification 
project was taken up again in February 1880, a different draft code produced by 
Edward Dillon Lewis was invoked.50 Too elegiac a tone over Stephen's lost dream and 
elevation to the Bench ignores the continuing public interest in legal reform. The 
Trades Union Congress had a sustained interest in the codification project. In 1877, 
Stephen and Wright, along with other prominent figures such as Lord Coleridge, had 
addressed its members.51 The T U C Parliamentary Committee subsequently sent a 
petition to the Lord Chancellor expressing support and requesting involvement in the 
refining of the code, because the magnitude of such law reform involved not only 
questions of law and procedure but also "subjects of vital interest to the social and 
political freedom of the people".52 This perspective did not change, as the powerful 
resolution passed in favour of codification in 1881 underlines. It indicates the extent to 
which this increasingly powerful national institution saw the need to link respectable 
skilled working class interests to this type of legal reform, albeit in a more radical 
direction than the Royal Commission proposal. Almost certainly, an amalgamation of 
Stephen's code with Wright's code would have suited them best, since the latter was far 
more radical in certain areas, such as free speech.53 
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Codification was also widely discussed in the printed media, not just in specialist 
publications such as the Law Times but also in national organs. In widely-respected 
and read periodicals including the Edinburgh Review, Nineteenth Century, and 
Fortnightly Review, articles on legal reform continued to stress the issue of codification, 
either as a main or a subsidiary focus. Even Punch expressed an interest in the topic.54 
In particular, The Times demonstrated an enduring commitment to the project in a 
number of leading articles into the 1880s, demonstrating the extent to which 
codification remained on the political agenda.55 To argue it was not a major issue 
because it was not flagged in electioneering as a central policy plank for either main 
party, or to point to Irish hostility, is to misunderstand Victorian perceptions of the 
politics of legal reform. 
The general desirability of such measures was not then identified as a party-specific 
issue. The intimate details of proposals were debated not along party lines, but across 
them, as the passages of the 1861 Act and the 1885 Criminal Law Amendment Act 
illustrate.56 There was, as a result of the efforts of the 1878-9 Royal Commission and 
Stephen's own work, to say nothing of the input of figures like Wright, a broad 
political consensus that codification was necessary. The distinctly shaky Disraeli 
government would not otherwise have dreamed of introducing the measure with a 
general election looming. As commentators like Hostettler and Colaiaco point out, it 
was expected that the 1879 Bill would have little difficulty in passing through 
Parliament. Its reintroduction in 1880 indicates that the furore over Cockburn's 
intervention had already died down, and that Stephen's response thereto had been 
widely accepted. True, some criticisms had surfaced, such as those identified by 
Hostettler in the Law Times, but it would have been surprising indeed had reservations 
not been voiced, and overall, the political mood in 1880 was still positive.57 The issue 
of legal reform was far from dead. 
It was not to be expected that an incoming administration would see codification as 
a matter of immediate urgency, but it did reappear on the government agenda in the 
1881-2 Queen's Speech, as a result of the efforts of Liberal supporters, including Henry 
Broadhurst. A Grand Committee on Law, a clear descendant of earlier bodies 
examining codification was created in 1882, though it was not, in the end, to issue a 
report of any substance. The intervention of crises in Ireland and the Transvaal do help 
to explain the temporary eclipse of codification in the parliamentary debates, but not 
entirely. More significant was the further exercise in ameliorating the dangerous 
tendencies of the masses by invoking the civilising effects of an extension of the 
franchise, as had been tried in 1867. This time, as a result of Acts in 1884 and 1885 
the majority of male heads of households were enfranchised, and the boundaries of 
parliamentary constituencies amended, better to reflect actual demographic concen-
trations. There was also an attempt to improve the operation of the legal system and 
remedy the defects of the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act by further efforts at 
consolidation. Consequently, the debates on legal reform in the first half of this decade 
were dominated by arguments over the precise details of what emerged as the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act 1885. 
Disappointments over the soothing effects of such measures, and in particular over 
the practical problems remaining unresolved by the 1885 Act, resulted in a willingness 
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to revisit codification in 1886.58 Time was set aside in the parliamentary session by the 
new Conservative administration, with a fair expectation of support for such a measure 
from the Liberal opposition. Stephen himself certainly expected such a development 
would involve a revival of his draft code. However, it must be remembered that there 
were now a variety of alternatives, including Wright's draft code, and any committee 
considering a codification Bill could very probably have sought to amalgamate these 
alternatives. But in fact, despite promises in 1886 that a "short well-considered Bill 
amending the criminal law" would be introduced in the next session, which could be 
expected to "be passed without any great difficulty, notwithstanding the opposition of 
the Irish members", the codification project was allowed to remain dormant.59 
The responsibility for this state of suspension, at a time when moves to codify 
aspects of civil law were proceeding smoothly and successfully towards fruition from 
the late 1880s into the 1890s, lies not with the Lord Chancellor, recalcitrant Irish 
members, or a hostile judiciary, but with a now little known legal figure who rejoiced 
in the soubriquet of 'the real Sleuth Hound of the Treasury'. Henry Bodkin Poland, 
Senior Counsel to the Treasury at the Central Criminal Court was the man entrusted 
by Lord Herschell with preparing a codification Bill in 1886, for introduction in 1887. 
Though he made positive noises to Herschell in Home Office papers, he was, as his 
subsequent biography based on extended conversations illustrates, profoundly opposed 
to criminal codification: "Something may be said for codification in general, but 
nothing for the codification of the Criminal Law. . . It is impossible to codify the 
Criminal Law of this country. . . the practical difficulties. . . are insuperable".60 He did, 
however, find a number of positive things to say about Stephen's code, including the 
issue of the locking up of juries. The basis for his opposition to codification was far 
broader than a simple hostility to some of the aspects of Stephen's code. It was not so 
much legal, or strictly societal, though he did say to his biographer Bowen-Rowlands 
that " Y o u cannot stabilise an essentially fluctuating thing like our Criminal Law" , 
because " A n y Code would pro tanto hamper the Judges in interpreting the Criminal 
Law in accordance with the requirements of the age".61 Rather, it was the economic 
dimension that occupied Poland. As he informed Lord Herschell, he had advised the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer that he feared such a code, particularly one that would 
promote the efficiency of the legal system and encourage more cases to be brought 
before the higher courts, would be too expensive.62 
It was still possible that the legal merits of codification could have seen its revival 
by subsequent governments. The matter remained before Parliament as colonies from 
Canada to Mauritius adopted criminal codification based on Stephen's Indian Code 
during the 1880s and 1890s. It remained a matter of interest to the print media too, 
as states such as Japan toyed with versions of British-style criminal codification. 
Stephen certainly turned his efforts to advocating the spread of civilisation (by which 
he effectively meant the spread of British values) via the export of criminal codification 
to nations as diverse as Russia and the U S A . But with Bodkin Poland remaining as 
the economic Cassandra for the project into the early twentieth century, placing 
codification back on the parliamentary agenda would always have faced considerable 
obstacles from the Treasury. Also of subsequent significance in explaining the 
suspension of the codification project was the redirection of the focus of efforts at 
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societally-driven legal reform from the mid-1890s. Neither women's issues nor Irish 
issues in their fin de siecle or Edwardian manifestations were susceptible to solutions 
via criminal codification. Thus, a Code Victoria was not to be. 
F U T U R E VISIONS 
Such visionary desires to regulate the social order might be interpreted as simply 
providing the concept of an achievable legal Utopia for those engaged in the practical 
operation of the law. However, as we enter the third millennium, many would argue 
that the visions of legal reform examined by our nineteenth century forebears warrant 
renewed consideration for much the same set of essentially societal reasons. The major 
difference is that now, legal reform is very much a matter of party politics. Carnwath 
J., recently appointed Chair of the Law Commission, has emphasised that he and his 
predecessors have been searching for the "Holy Grail" of codification for the last 
twenty years. The Commission has produced some twenty detailed reports awaiting 
implementation but these have been hampered by the lack of any systematic procedure 
or concerted political will to streamline the criminal law. Carnwath advocates that 
immediate action is necessary unless the Government is content "to leave the courts 
fighting twenty-first century crime with nineteenth century weapons".63 Further 
impetus is provided by the recent enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 which, as 
the previous chair of the Law Commission, Arden J. argues, has created an even more 
urgent and pressing need for reform as "many aspects of the criminal law may undergo 
change" once the Act comes into force.64 If the modernisation of the criminal law is, 
to use Carnwath J.'s words, to be more than "simply a pipe dream" then the 
Government must take a more forward thinking and proactive approach. As Carnwath 
hopes, " A political commitment to codification of the criminal law with a programme 
to achieve it over this and the next Parliament, would be the ultimate prize of my term 
of office".65 
To figures such as Brougham, Stephen, and Holker, the codification of the criminal 
law was much more than a pipe-dream. It is so now, being identified as the key to 
achievement of a more stable and civilised society. Clearly it is a Utopian ideal, but 
such are generally necessary for the achievement of any socially-driven legislative 
reforms. Now, however, there is an extra dimension, carrying with it overtones of 
patriotism. Present reformers must accept that unless Britain seizes the initiative, its 
sovereign power to determine both the substance and procedural aspects of the criminal 
law will be severely curtailed. Some elements of the executive of the European Union 
are already pressing for a common pan-European criminal justice system or corpus 
juris. The Eurojust Project demands not only a pan-European prosecutor but also a 
uniform, i.e. codified, body of criminal law, applicable in all member states. Currently 
Jack Straw, the Home Secretary, has rejected the notion of a uniform legal system on 
the grounds that legal systems are embedded in national and political cultures - an 
interesting reaffirmation of the socio-cultural dimensions to such legislation. He asserts 
that despite the fact that the Scottish legal system has much in common with the 
Continental system this does not prevent co-operation with the criminal justice systems 
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of the rest of the United Kingdom.66 Ben Hall, research director for the Centre for 
European Reform has said that " A single legal code for Europe is fantasy".67 
However, the reality is that the nineteenth century vision of a Code Victoria, which 
attempted, but failed to bring the English criminal law more in line with the continental 
approach, has never been closer. The difference is that the nature of the ideal society 
encapsulated in such legal visions for the future may no longer be under English/British 
control. 
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